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Where Has All the Music Gone? 
Reflections on the Fortieth Anniversary 
of Fiji’s Independence
Brij V Lal
On the whole it is better to explore history rather than to 
repress or deny it.
edward said, Culture and Imperialism 
It is not enough to stand at a tangent of other peoples’ conven-
tions; we should be the most unforgiving critics of our own.
tony judt, “on being austere and 
being jewish”
[There is a] difference between the silence after the music, and 
the silence when there is no music.
vincent o’sullivan, in 
John Mansfield Thompson: 
Notes towards a Biography 
On 10 October 2010, Fiji marked the fortieth anniversary of its indepen-
dence from the United Kingdom after ninety-six years of colonial rule. It 
was a predictably subdued affair. The guest of honor, Sir Michael Somare 
of Papua New Guinea, failed to turn up for the celebrations. There was in 
truth little to celebrate. The Public Emergency Regulations in place since 
April 2009, when the constitution of the country was abrogated, severely 
curtailed mobility and free speech, threatening retribution to anyone who 
questioned the conventional wisdom of the day—all this in marked con-
trast to the joy and (misplaced) optimism that attended the severance of 
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the colonial umbilical cord in 1970. What a tumultuous forty years it 
has been in the ill-fated history of that otherwise richly endowed coun-
try: coups and constitutional crises, state-sponsored constitutional engi-
neering, more coups, and endless cul-de-sacs. The prospect of stability, 
peace, and prosperity at the time of independence—the sense that Fiji, 
as a  multi ethnic society, might have a lesson to teach similarly situated 
countries in the developing world at the end of colonial rule—seems like 
a dream now. What was once thought to be the fate only of newly inde-
pendent countries in Africa and Latin America whose fledgling democratic 
values were regularly subverted by the military in the name of good gov-
ernance has now become an integral part of Fiji’s postcolonial narrative. 
And there is no end in sight to its unpredictable future. 
I was in my final year of high school when Fiji became independent. 
I remember the occasion vividly. Lollies were distributed at the morning 
assembly along with miniature plastic navy blue Fiji flags; the Union Jack 
FDPHGRZQIRUWKHODVWWLPHDVZHGXWLIXOO\UHFLWHG§*RG6DYHWKH4XHHQ¨
for the last time; speeches were made by Mr Sukru Rehman, chairman of 
WKHVFKRROªV%RDUGRI*RYHUQRUVDQGE\WKH'LVWULFW&RPPLVVLRQHU0U
Dodds; and words were spoken about achieving independence with toler-
ance, harmony, and justice and about the legacy the British were leaving 
us: a sense of fair play, the rule of law, and the fundamentals of parliamen-
tary democracy. It was a quietly proud moment in our youthful lives, and 
we were told never to forget the wonderful legacy our colonial masters 
were bequeathing us. I did not know then that I would spend my entire 
life variously engaged with Fiji’s history and politics. I am a part of the his-
tory I now seek to understand. I cannot and do not claim detachment or 
objectivity. But I will say that what I express is not entirely idiosyncratic, 
and that in some ample measure it reflects the opinion and experience of a 
section of the community from which I come and those of the generation 
of which I am a part. In the sounds of my footsteps, many would, I am 
sure, recognize the echoes of their own.
The late 1960s was one of the most dynamic periods in Fijian history, 
comparable in some senses to the 1990s, full of animated debate and dis-
cussion about what kind of political culture was appropriate for a multi-
ethnic society such as Fiji (B Lal 1992). Opinion was genuinely divided. 
The National Federation Party (nfp), with its base in the Indo-Fijian com-
munity, advocated a nonracial common roll of voting with one person, 
one vote, one value. The Alliance Party, nominally multiracial but solidly 
backed by the Fijian and European communities, wanted nothing less than 
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the retention of full communal, that is, race-based rolls. The Federation 
wanted Fiji to become independent with an elected Fijian head of state, 
while the Alliance was lukewarm about independence and wanted ties to 
WKH%ULWLVKPRQDUFK\PDLQWDLQHG4XHVWLRQVZHUHDVNHGDERXWVXFKVHQVL-
tive subjects as the role and place of traditional social and cultural institu-
tions in the fabric of the wider society, and about the social, cultural, and 
institutional impediments to change and growth in Fijian society (Belshaw 
1964; Spate 1959; Watters 1969).
These were questions that I came upon much later at university. In rural 
/DEDVDRQWKHLVODQGRI9DQXD/HYXLQDYLOODJHZLWKRXWUXQQLQJZDWHU
paved roads, or electricity, where the radio was still a novelty in many 
households and newspapers were an expensive luxury only a few could 
afford, we lived largely in blissful ignorance. We had few means of find-
ing out what was going on in the world. We had no contact with Fijians 
who lived on the outer edges of our settlement, no comprehension of their 
concerns, aspirations, and needs, just as they were innocent about ours. 
We were preoccupied with making do with what little we had, which was 
very little indeed. More than national politics, the affairs of the sugar 
LQGXVWU\WKHQXQGHUWKHPLJKW\&RORQLDO6XJDU5HILQLQJ&RPSDQ\csr), 
were of much greater concern to us. The sugar industry sustained us. It 
was our lifeblood. It was the reason we were in Fiji. The news of national 
politics came to us via the occasional Hindi newspapers such as Jagriti, 
Shanti Dut, and the Fiji Samachar. More immediately, it came through 
occasional visiting politicians—important men, impressively dressed, who 
talked about independence, about pride and sacrifice, about a new future, 
things that few of us actually understood or contemplated. That luxury 
was denied to us by our desperate economic situation. Our cane-grow-
ing village was solid nfp country; the Federation was “our party.” It had 
fought the csr on our behalf. It carried our hopes and aspirations. There 
were a few Alliance supporters in the village, such as my eldest brother, 
because of whom I was sometimes taunted at school as a traitor to our 
community; but since such people were few and far between, they were 
generally tolerated as misguided men with misplaced loyalties, harmless.
At high school, politics was taboo, even in the higher grades. The colo-
nial protocol of separating politics from education was strictly observed. 
It was as if nothing was happening in the country that truly mattered to 
us. In our school debates, we chose (or, rather our teachers chose for us) 
topics such as “Alcoholics should have no place in society” and “Why stu-
dents should be allowed to wear thongs [flip-flops or slippers] to school,” 
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but nothing more serious (B Lal 2001). Politics was a dangerous, destabi-
lizing territory, best left unexplored. The colonial educational bureaucracy 
kept a close, watchful eye on what went on in the classroom, and we were 
all focused on preparing for the final exam, which would determine our 
fate and our school’s ranking in the colonial prestige system. In our his-
tory classes, we learned about the unification of Germany and Italy and 
about the causes and consequences of the First World War and the Russian 
Revolution, but nothing about Fiji itself, or the broader Pacific region, for 
WKDWPDWWHU&RORQLDOUXOHZDVQRORQJHUIDVKLRQDEOHDQGLWVGHIHQVHZDV
problematic. The irony is glaringly obvious now. There we were, people 
who would inherit the challenges and opportunities of independence, Fiji’s 
next generation of leaders, completely unaware of important develop-
ments taking place all around us. And as products of largely mono-racial 
schools, we would be called on to play national leadership roles on a mul-
tiracial stage for which we were spectacularly ill prepared. No wonder Fiji 
foundered on its postcolonial journey.
Fiji embarked on this postcolonial journey as we entered university. The 
opening of the University of the South Pacific in Suva must count as one of 
the turning points in modern South Pacific history, providing higher edu-
cation to masses of students from poor homes who, before then, would 
have been deprived of the opportunities of tertiary education altogether. 
Higher education in colonial Fiji was the privilege of a selected elite: usu-
DOO\DGR]HQRUVRVFKRODUVVHQWWR$XVWUDOLDDQG1HZ=HDODQGWRVWXG\
“useful” subjects in preparation for careers in the teaching profession and 
in low-level administration. The university was for us an enlarging and 
enriching experience—but no more informative about what was going on 
in political circles in Fiji. Once again, we had our sports, hiking, social, 
and cultural clubs; we staged plays, read poetry, and went bushwalking, 
but serious discussion of politics was absent, or confined to a few indi-
viduals. The Indo-Fijians generally assumed that their Fijian counterparts 
were supporters of the Alliance Party while they, in turn, suspected us of 
being nfp sympathizers. Given that the political parties were essentially 
race-based, we were conscious of the ever-present danger that any criti-
cism of a political party could easily be interpreted as a provocative attack 
on an ethnic group; and so the boundaries remained intact, and we kept 
our thoughts largely to ourselves. 
2WKHU3DFLILF,VODQGVVWXGHQWVIURP6ëPRD7RQJDWKH&RRN,VODQGV
and the Solomons, talked proudly of their history as beneficial and nour-
ishing influences in their lives. They had a history to celebrate, which had 
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a coherence borne of ancient heritage or forged in response to colonial 
UXOHWKH0DXPRYHPHQWLQ6ëPRD0DDVLQD5XOHLQ6RORPRQ,VODQGVWKH
monarchy in Tonga). Their obvious pride in their national identity was a 
source of envy for us. We had no overarching sense of a common identity; 
we were “Indians” and “Fijians,” separate in our conceptions of the past 
and divergent in our understanding of the present. We hardly spoke each 
other’s language. Our memory was racially compartmentalized. While 
one group lauded the policies of colonial rule, the other rejected them. In 
our vision of what Fiji as a multiethnic society should be, we were poles 
apart, a disparity symbolized most immediately by our different attach-
ments to communal and common roll systems of voting. Our traditions 
of political discourse were different: one was open and robust, the other 
hedged in by a careful observance of rituals and protocols of hierarchy. 
The space of common concerns was small, although social boundaries 
were freely breached in the lived experience of daily life. For us, history 
could not provide a serviceable ideology of nation building as it could and 
did for many of our Pacific neighbors. There was little we could agree on.
This was the unspoken reality on the ground, but our national myth 
evoked a different image. The early years of independence were warm 
and fuzzy. We had become independent without strife. Our links with the 
British monarchy remained intact. The old colonial pattern of political 
representation, with paramountcy for Fijians and privilege for Europeans, 
was maintained, and Indo-Fijians had to content themselves with the illu-
sion of parity in the overall scheme of things. We were paraded before the 
world as a model of multiracial democracy. “The way the world should 
be,” Pope John Paul II had intoned on a fleeting visit to the country in 
1985. That became our national mantra, shamelessly self-promotional. 
But deep inside us, I am not sure we really believed this myth. Indepen-
dence had arrived peacefully, but none of the deep, underlying problems 
about power sharing, land leases, or the underpinnings of affirmative 
action had been resolved. We were reluctant to look into the abyss that 
separated us.
In truth, we had merely papered over the cracks and fractures that lay 
just beneath the surface. There were certain assumptions and understand-
ings underpinning the independence order that lay unexplored lest we dis-
cover the hollowness that lay beneath the center of our public life. Race, 
we were repeatedly told, was a fact of life; in truth, it was on its way to 
becoming a way of life. Every issue of public policy came to be viewed 
through the prism of race. We were asked for our race when we opened 
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a bank account, applied for a driving license, or left or entered the coun-
try. In scholarship awards and public-service promotions, race became a 
consequential factor as part of the national equation of affirmative action. 
“Blood will flow,” Ratu Kamisese Mara said menacingly, if Fijian sen-
sitivities about land and leadership were ever breached. Race serviced a 
convenient political ideology, but it was also deeply flawed. Neither the 
Fijians nor the Indo-Fijians were homogenous communities. That much 
was obvious to us. There were interests and concerns that transgressed 
communal boundaries in many parts of Fiji. Nonetheless, the overall 
architecture of national life was race-based.
Expatriate academic analysts scratched the surface and developed the 
theory of “Three Fijis” (Fisk 1970). There was some truth to this char-
acterization, although fundamental structural changes in the economy 
were surreptitiously unsettling established orthodoxies. The Fijians were 
behind in some sectors but considerably ahead in others, such as owner-
ship of land, timber, and marine resources. Affecting us most directly, the 
Fijian government of the day adopted an affirmative action policy in favor 
of indigenous Fijians in the field of education. An education commission 
in 1969 had recommended that 50 percent of all government scholarships 
be reserved for indigenous Fijians, with the unexpended funds designated 
specifically for Fijian educational projects (Sherlock and others 1969). 
Fijian disadvantage in education, and in the professions generally, was a 
direct result of the policies and visions of an earlier generation of Fijian 
leaders, principally Ratu Sir Lala Sukuna, who thought that the place for 
his people was in the subsistence sector in the villages, under the guid-
ance of chiefly leadership, and that higher education was to remain the 
preserve of the chiefly elite (Sukuna 1984). In the abstract, the policy of 
racial balance made sense, but it was quite another matter at the personal 
level to see Fijian students getting scholarships for far lower marks than 
Indo-Fijian students. That policy of discrimination inevitably bred resent-
ment. We felt as if we were the stepchildren of the state. In the civil service, 
senior Indo-Fijians stared blankly at the glass ceiling (B Lal 2010). The 
feeling of disappointment was muted, but it was real. A few years after 
independence, the warm mantra of multiracialism espoused by the leaders 
seemed strangely cold.
Things went from bad to worse after the mid-1970s. In 1974, Sakeasi 
Butadroka, former Alliance junior minister, founded the Fijian National-
ist Party with its motto, “Fiji for Fijians.” The following year, on the fifth 
anniversary of Fiji’s independence, he proposed a provocative motion in 
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Parliament to have the Indians deported from Fiji, with the expense of 
relocation to be paid by the British government (B Lal 1992, 235–238). 
In hindsight, the motion seems ludicrous, nothing more than a rhetorical 
flourish of the Fijian nationalist fringe. But at the time, it had a power-
ful, unsettling effect on us. In 1974, Idi Amin had expelled long-settled 
Indians from Uganda for no reason other than their industry and hard-
earned prosperity. If it could happen in Uganda (and, earlier, in Burma), 
there was no obvious reason why it could not happen in Fiji. The Alliance 
government’s political point-scoring response to the motion—condemn-
ing Butadroka but affirming support of the rights of all citizens, not only 
Indians, who were its specific targets—deepened our sense of alienation, 
especially when it became clear that the motion’s sentiment, in varying 
degrees, was shared fairly widely in the Fijian community, according 
to Ratu David Toganivalu, himself a man of widespread cross-cultural 
friendships. For the first time, many Indo-Fijians began to feel that Fiji 
PLJKWQRWDIWHUDOOEHWKHLUSHUPDQHQWKRPH&DQDGLDQ3ULPH0LQLVWHU
Pierre Trudeau’s more liberal, skills-based migration policy opened doors 
that began to attract many. A gradual drift began.
Two years later, the tremors of the earthquake started by Butadroka 
were felt when the Alliance lost the general election in April 1977, with 
25 percent of the Fijian votes going to the Nationalists. Five months later, 
the Alliance recaptured its natural constituency by effectively jettisoning 
its multiracial philosophy and embracing an openly ethnic one. The Alli-
ance learned anew the truth of a central assumption that underpinned the 
independence settlement: that Fijians would remain in power so long as 
they remained united. Henceforth, the main preoccupation of the Alli-
ance would be the preservation of Fijian ethnic solidarity. A similar con-
solidation was taking place on the Indo-Fijian side. Having won the April 
elections by the narrowest of margins (two seats), the National Federa-
tion Party tried for four days to form a coalition government with the 
Alliance, an offer that the party flatly refused. The dithering allowed the 
JRYHUQRUJHQHUDO5DWX6LU*HRUJH&DNREDXWRDSSRLQWDPLQRULW\JRY-
ernment headed by Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara. The nfp’S delay in forming 
a government and its internal but well-publicized leadership skirmishes 
were blamed for this, but everyone knew privately that an “Indian” prime 
minister would not be acceptable to Fijians, proclamations of democratic 
principles and multiracial values notwithstanding (B Lal 2010). One by 
one, all the founding Indo-Fijian members of the Alliance party left or 
were forced to leave on one pretext or another, finding a welcoming home 
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in the nfp, headed by its new leader, Jai Ram Reddy. Reddy had not been 
part of the bitter ideological fights of the pre-independence era. He wanted 
all Indians united under one umbrella, precisely the goal that Ratu Mara 
had in mind for the Fijians. Racial polarization was almost complete. We 
could feel it in our bones.
In 1982, things nearly boiled over. Indo-Fijians had joined hands with 
some western Fijian leaders who were disgruntled with the Alliance gov-
ernment’s development policies (especially about the lucrative pine indus-
try), and they nearly succeeded in toppling the Fijian government. Racism 
UDLVHG LWVXJO\KHDGDJDLQ&DOOVZHUHPDGH WRGHSRUW ,QGR)LMLDQ OHDG-
ers, refuse renewal of leases to Indo-Fijian tenants unless they agreed to 
Fijian political control, and amend the constitution to enshrine Fijian par-
DPRXQWF\&ULVHVZHUHPDQXIDFWXUHGDQGHYHQWVVWDJHGWRURXVHSHRSOHªV
HPRWLRQV2OGWLPHUVZLOO UHPHPEHU WKH §)RXU&RUQHUV¨ SURJUDP DQG
WKH&DUUROO5HSRUW%/DO1983). Once again, the reluctance of the Fijian 
establishment to concede power or to share it except on its own terms was 
on full display. The tensions generated by the political debates percolated 
down to the grassroots, subtly influencing (and infecting) cross-cultural 
attitudes and perceptions. There was cordiality in public but a great deal 
of circumspection in private. Not everything, however, was as the Alli-
DQFHQDUUDWLYHSRUWUD\HGLWWREH9LOODJHVDQGVHWWOHPHQWVZHUHFKDQJLQJ
in significant ways as the tentacles of the modern cash economy reached 
the hitherto isolated sections of the community (Taylor 1987). Travel and 
technology were transforming urban attitudes and relationships. More 
and more children were attending multiracial schools, and people of all 
ethnicities were feeling the effects of a stalled economy and lengthened 
unemployment lines caused, in part, by World Bank–inspired policies. A 
multiracial working class was haphazardly in the making. Old polarities 
and binary oppositions were making less and less sense.
One result of the dissatisfaction with the existing orthodoxies and 
power arrangements in the country was the formation of a (nominally) 
multiracial Fiji Labour Party (flp) in 1985. Rhetorically left leaning, it 
was in fact cautiously pragmatic, or pragmatically cautious, but its emer-
gence posed a potential threat to the established order of things Fijian 
in which the conventional wisdom held that the business of leadership 
was the prerogative of chiefs. flp criticism of the eastern chiefs who had 
dominated Fijian political discourse for much of the twentieth century 
caused further alarm in minds accustomed to deference and acquiescence 
to duly constituted authority. It came as little surprise that the Fiji Labour 
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Party–National Federation Party coalition, which won the 1987 general 
elections, was swiftly deposed by the Fijian military in the name of the 
“Fijian race.” I argued at the time that the coup was more than the simple 
racial contest it was made out to be by the supporters of the coup and by 
the international media, and that it was really about defeated politicians 
taking back power by any means possible (B Lal 1988). This narrative 
lacked traction in those emotionally charged days when “race” was the 
privileged explanatory factor of the coup.
The story of the 1987 coups is too well known to be retold here. The 
wounds it inflicted on the body politic, social fabric, and interethnic rela-
tions were profound and enduring. The daily harassment of people, the 
religious intolerance symbolized by the “Sunday Ban,” the nonrenewal 
of leases, and the rampant discrimination in the public service left a deep 
wound in the Indo-Fijian psyche. The sense of rejection and humiliation 
was deep—just how deep would become clear a few years later. I think 
I misjudged the depth of the hurt. The 1999 general elections were the 
first time that Sitiveni Rabuka had to seek Indo-Fijian support to govern. 
Under the 1990&RQVWLWXWLRQZKLFKZDVFRPSOHWHO\UDFHEDVHGKHRQO\
had to court the Fijian electorate, but there were twenty-five “Open” (that 
is, nonracial) seats under the 1997&RQVWLWXWLRQ%/DO1997). 
The Indo-Fijians rejected his overtures for partnership in opening a new 
chapter in Fiji’s political evolution. All his achievements in helping give Fiji 
the most liberal constitution it ever had counted for little. I campaigned 
vigorously throughout the country for the Rabuka-Reddy coalition par-
ties, explaining the contents of the new constitution, why it needed to be 
given time to prove its worth, and how it was paving the way for a new 
future for Fiji away from its preoccupation with the politics of race. To be 
sure, there were good reasons why the Rabuka government was unpopu-
lar: his administration was riddled with corruption, mismanagement, and 
scandals that nearly drove the country to the brink of bankruptcy. Poli-
tics of patronage were the order of the day. A new era was beckoning, I 
argued, but all this fell on deaf ears; the electorate wanted revenge and 
retribution. Rabuka had done something terribly wrong and he could not 
JRXQSXQLVKHG0DKHQGUD&KDXGKU\WKH/DERXUOHDGHUXQGHUVWRRGWKH
Indian psychology well and exploited it adeptly for his own purposes, 
even though it was his support that enabled Sitiveni Rabuka to become 
prime minister in 1992 in the first place. But, sadly, defeating Rabuka 
WXUQHGRXWWREHD3\UUKLFYLFWRU\IRU&KDXGKU\
The 1987 coup sent an important message to the Indo-Fijian commu-
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nity. As Rabuka said at the time, they could live in Fiji and make as much 
money as they wanted, but they should never aspire to political power, 
which should always remain in Fijian hands (Dean and Ritova 1988). The 
Indo-Fijian community was caught in a cul-de-sac. With very little to fall 
back on—the land leases were expiring at a rapid rate, discrimination was 
rampant in the public sector—many Indo-Fijians began to contemplate 
migration, which had started in earnest soon after the May military take-
over. A trickle turned into a torrent. Precise figures are understandably 
uncertain, but a conservative estimate would put the numbers of those 
who left after the first coup at over 120,000. As a result, the proportion of 
the total population constituted by Indo-Fijians has declined from around 
49 percent in 1987 to around 33 percent now. And the decline will con-
tinue well into the future through a continuously falling birthrate and 
XQFHDVLQJPLJUDWLRQ&KHWW\DQG3UDVDG1993). 
This huge demographic transformation is full of important implica-
tions. To start with, the fear of “Indian domination” that so plagued the 
dynamics of Fiji politics since the end of the Second World War, when the 
Indo-Fijians for the first time exceeded the indigenous Fijians, has gone 
forever. You can feel this in the texture and tenor of ordinary conver-
sations with Fijians who know it in their hearts that Fiji is once again 
“their country.” This transformation has demonstrated the potential for 
the reconfiguration of Fiji politics. It has, for instance, opened up more 
space for democratic debate among Fijians about such sensitive topics as 
chiefly titles and inheritance in ways that would have been unimaginable 
during the reign of paramount chiefs in the early years of independence. 
In the 1990s, there was a proliferation of Fijian political parties, each with 
its own specific agenda, which opened up and reenergized the discussion 
of intra-Fijian issues (Durutalo 2000). The carefully nurtured artifact of 
“Fijian unity” was visibly fractured, both by the departure from the politi-
cal stage of paramount chiefs who had once wielded overarching, unify-
ing influence over their people and by the disappearance of traditional 
gatekeepers of knowledge and information by the advent of modern tech-
nology, including radio, television, the Internet, and the visual and print 
media. Fragmentation is going to be the future order of the day. “Race” 
has lost its edge in ordinary conversation and behavior.
Most of those who left the country were people of talent and education 
whose skills were in great demand overseas, especially in Australia and 
1HZ=HDODQGGRFWRUVQXUVHVDFFRXQWDQWVVFLHQFHWHDFKHUVPHFKDQLFV
and businessmen. The best and the brightest have left, are leaving, or will 
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leave; on this there is general consensus. Among the migrants are members 
of my own family: three brothers in Brisbane, a sister in Darwin, and nieces, 
nephews, and cousins scattered across the globe. Those who remain in Fiji 
do so for reasons of business, lifestyle, or enduring commitment, but they 
have their families and their investments safely “parked” elsewhere (the 
word is theirs, not mine). Some who are overseas talk of retiring “back 
home,” but few so far have taken the opportunity, now on offer, of becom-
ing permanent residents or citizens. They are keeping their options open—
once bitten, twice shy. Among those leaving are people who in the nor-
mal course of events might have been expected to take a more moderate, 
longer-term view of the future. Their departure affected the power base of 
the National Federation Party, playing an important part in its downfall 
in the 1999 elections (B Lal 2010). Those who remained and who could 
not leave—unskilled workers, farmers, the elderly—had nothing to lose by 
demanding the sky and fell prey to the demagoguery and vaguely emanci-
pating, empowering rhetoric of the Fiji Labour Party. Among those left in 
Fiji are the desperately poor with few hopes and little opportunity. They 
will continue to be vulnerable to the entreaties of opportunistic politicians 
preying on the needs and aspirations of the truly desperate. And the young 
will continue to migrate through family sponsorships, arranged marriages, 
or other means. Many are taking courses at tertiary institutions in the 
hope of improving their chances in the migration stakes.
7KHFUHDWLRQRIWKH)LMLDQGLDVSRUDLQ$XVWUDOLDDQG1HZ=HDODQGLQ
particular, is an important recent social phenomenon. We are not talking 
about “migrant communities” in the old sense of a rupture of a more or 
less permanent kind. They might more accurately be described as “trans-
migrant” communities whose links with their former homelands are never 
severed but nurtured in a variety of novel ways. People maintain contact 
with friends and family back home through the Internet (e-mails, Face-
book), through regular telephone conversations (via Skype), and through 
periodic visits. Air travel is not as prohibitively expensive as it once was, 
DQGSK\VLFDOSUR[LPLW\KHOSV$XVWUDOLDDQG1HZ=HDODQGDUHMXVWDIHZ
hours away by plane. People help with scholarships, refurbishment of 
temples and schools, medical supplies, and relief efforts during the natu-
UDOFDODPLWLHVWKDWYLVLW)LMLZLWKPXQGDQHUHJXODULW\HYHU\\HDU&OXVWHUV
form around places of origin in Fiji (Ba, Labasa) or around religious or 
cultural affiliation (Sangam, Muslim League, Sanatan Dharam, and Arya 
Samaj) to provide more targeted assistance in times of need. This sort of 
contribution is difficult to measure, but it is real and it is increasing. The 
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principle of gift giving is as much a part of this modern situation as it is of 
“traditional” societies much studied by anthropologists.
Many migrants left Fiji in emotionally difficult circumstances, giving 
up secure jobs that once held the prospect of promotion and permanency, 
selling homes and other property for a fraction of their normal price, rup-
turing relations built over generations, taking a journey into the unknown 
from which they knew there would be no return. The pain of disloca-
tion is real, if never fully expressed. Understandably, their attitude toward 
those whose policies led to their displacement in the first place is suffused 
with a mixture of bitterness and deep anger. Many became strong sup-
porters of the Fiji Labour Party and vocal critics of the more moderate 
and consensus-building strategies of its opponent, the National Federa-
tion Party. Jai Ram Reddy’s plea to make a fresh start, to let bygones be 
bygones, fell on deaf ears. Labour’s red-hot, punitive rhetoric was more 
to their liking. It came as little surprise that many Indo-Fijian residents 
LQ $XVWUDOLD DQG1HZ=HDODQG DOVR EHFDPH YRFDO VXSSRUWHUV RI )UDQN
Bainimarama’s December 2006 coup for a variety of motives, not the least 
of which was revenge. Fijians had caused a lot of misery for Indo-Fijians 
in the past, enthusiastically endorsing the nationalist rhetoric of previous 
coups. Now it was time for them to “taste their own medicine,” as the 
phrase goes in Fiji. Many are reluctant to believe anything but a positive 
narrative of the ongoing Fijian saga—that whatever the present state of 
affairs, Bainimarama will come good in the end. He therefore needs sup-
port, not opposition. Angered by my opposition to the latest coup, some 
,QGR)LMLDQVLQ6\GQH\SHWLWLRQHGP\YLFHFKDQFHOORU,DQ&KXEEWRILUH
me from the Australian National University for my publicly aired and 
widely disseminated views.
While migration was proceeding apace, other developments in the 
1980s and 1990s aided the alienation of the Indo-Fijian community in Fiji. 
Among them were the Rabuka government’s avowedly pro-Fijian policies, 
especially during its first term, when Rabuka seemed overtly indifferent to 
the concerns of the Indo-Fijians. He allocated government funds to enable 
Fijian landowning units to purchase freehold land on the market but 
appeared to do little to address the anxieties of Indo-Fijian tenants evicted 
from expiring leases. Scandals rocked the government. The economic ratio-
nalist policies of Finance Minister Jim Ah Koy affected all workers, Fijian 
and Indo-Fijian alike, especially at the lower levels. Jobs were lost and 
unemployment lines lengthened. The man who had committed the coup 
was now embarking on a course that was compounding Indo-Fijian misery. 
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The expiration of the thirty-year agricultural leases under the Agricul-
tural Landlord and Tenant Act in the 1990s caused havoc in the Indo-Fijian 
farming community (P Lal 2009). Leases were not renewed partly because 
Fijian landowners themselves wanted to enter the industry in which until 
then they had been bystanders. But land was power, too: Fijian power. 
Around 83 percent of the land was owned in inalienable right by Fijians. 
3HRSOHOLNH0DULND4DULNDXWKH)LMLDQQDWLRQDOLVWPDQDJHURIWKH1DWLYH
Land Trust Board, realized this early and used land as a blunt instrument 
to extract maximum political concessions from the Indo-Fijians. Tenan-
cies would be renewed, the message went out, if Indo-Fijians accepted the 
principle of Fijian political control. The threat of nonrenewal of leases 
came at a particularly inopportune time for struggling farmers: the ancient 
milling structures were collapsing, husbandry practices had deteriorated, 
tonnage per acre produced was low, and the preferential access to the 
European Union under the Lomé Agreement was about to expire. It was 
always in the nature of the leases that they would end one day, and the 
theoretical possibility was constantly in the back of growers’ minds. But 
when it finally eventuated, the reality was different. The experience of 
being uprooted after generations of living in a place, seeing one’s formerly 
productive farm revert to bush, and having to start afresh in a new occu-
pation in a new place, often among complete strangers, was wrenching. It 
left many—including members of my own extended family—deeply trau-
matized and unforgiving of those whose policies had brought about their 
demise as cane growers.
Ironically, many positive things were happening in the country concur-
rently, the most important being the review of the racially lopsided 1990 
&RQVWLWXWLRQZKLFK5DEXND DORQJZLWK -DL5DP5HGG\ KDGSOD\HG D
genuinely important role in establishing. It was a courageous move, going 
against the grain of nationalist Fijian opinion, which was completely 
averse to any concession in the direction of political partnership with the 
Indo-Fijian community. The 1997&RQVWLWXWLRQZDVDJHQXLQH LPSURYH-
ment over its previous counterparts. There was limited but important 
movement in the direction of non-racialism. Race had been removed as 
a factor in affirmative action programs. The constitution had significant 
human rights provisions. Most importantly, the power-sharing arrange-
ments of the constitution ensured that Indo-Fijians, if they won a suffi-
cient number of seats in the House of Representatives, would as a matter 
of right, not charity, be entitled to an invitation into the cabinet. This is 
what the community had been struggling toward for nearly a century, 
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and the opportunity was now within its grasp. But constitutional reform 
counted for little in the countryside, which was emptying from the nonre-
newal of leases, and in the mushrooming squatter settlements fringing the 
main urban centers of Fiji, where memories of deprivation and displace-
ment were fresh and deep and the struggle for sustainable living getting 
more difficult by the day. The constitution won’t put food on the table, 
opportunistic politicians told the people, who believed them. Among them 
was a former university academic, now a senior academic administrator: 
0DKHQGUD&KDXGKU\
&KDXGKU\ªV)LML/DERXU3DUW\ZDV WKHFOHDUEHQHILFLDU\RI WKHJUDGX-
ally growing reservoir of Indo-Fijian hurt and grievance (Fraenkel and 
Firth 2007). He won the 1999 general elections by annihilating his old 
enemy, the National Federation Party, which failed to win a single seat. 
Apart from anything else, the Indo-Fijian electorate was unforgiving of 
nfp’s embracing of Sitiveni Rabuka. Grudges run deep in the Indo-Fijian 
SV\FKH%XWDIWHUD\HDULQRIILFHWKH&KDXGKU\JRYHUQPHQWZDVWRSSOHG
in a quasi-military coup led by the improbably self-styled Fijian national-
ist George Speight. It was a dark moment for Fiji, but darker still for the 
Indo-Fijian community, which saw, yet again, a government elected by 
them overturned by force. It did not matter that the causes of the Speight 
insurrection were complex and had more to do with intra-Fijian rivalries 
and struggles for power. The overthrow simply reinforced the feelings of 
rejection and marginalization already well entrenched in the broader nar-
UDWLYHRIWKH,QGR)LMLDQH[SHULHQFHLQWKHSRVWFRORQLDOSHULRG&KDXGKU\ªV
fate might have been affected by his rather abrasive style (developed in 
the cauldron of Fiji’s combative trade union movement), his ill-advised 
confrontation with the media, and his untimely and reportedly unilateral 
 pursuit of policies of land reform, which could have been postponed to 
more propitious times; but all this was ignored. For many, it was enough 
that a prime minister of Indo-Fijian descent had been overthrown. 
&KDXGKU\LWVKRXOGEHHPSKDVL]HGZDVQRWWKHFDXVHRI*HRUJH6SHLJKWªV
insurrection, though he might have contributed to it unwittingly.
What followed made matters even worse, deepening Indo-Fijian disen-
chantment with the unfolding events. An interim administration was set 
XSE\WKHPLOLWDU\DQGOHGE\/DLVHQLD4DUDVHWKHPHUFKDQWEDQNHUDQG
former head of the Fiji Development Bank. This administration morphed 
into a new political party, the Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua (sdl), 
which won the general elections in 2001 and remained in power until 
20067KHWUDJHG\ZDVWKDW4DUDVHLQKLVILUVWWHUPKDGQRWOHDUQHGWKH
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lessons of Fiji’s recent history. Everything he did repudiated the spirit of 
consensus building of the 1990s. He openly courted the Fijian nation-
alist fringe to remain in power (Fraenkel, Firth, and Lal 20094DUDVH
gave the Fiji Labour Party miniscule portfolios of no significance, which 
/DERXUULJKWO\ UHIXVHG VHHNLQJ6XSUHPH&RXUW UXOLQJRQ WKHQXPHULFDO
composition of the multiparty cabinet. The fundamental thrust of his gov-
ernment’s policy was to address the concerns and needs of the indigenous 
Fijian community to the exclusion of virtually everything else. His read-
ing of the Fijian scene was as dated as it was blinkered, premised on the 
notion that the Fijians were the disadvantaged community needing special 
assistance, while Indo-Fijians were the well-to-do ones—this when every 
piece of objective, verifiable evidence showed that poverty and disadvan-
tage paid no respect to ethnic boundaries but freely transgressed them; 
that, indeed, rural Indo-Fijians comprised some of the most disadvantaged 
groups in Fiji society (as shown in various studies by Wadan Narsey, eg, 
Narsey 20084DUDVHªV §)LMLDQ%OXHSULQW¨SURPLVHGPDVVLYH DVVLVWDQFH
for specifically Fijian projects. His education policies directed special 
assistance to Fijian-run schools but not to Indian-run schools, even though 
many of them in urban areas had more Fijian students than Indian. The 
RYHUDOOQDUUDWLYHRIWKHILUVW4DUDVHJRYHUQPHQWZDV)LMLDQHPSRZHUPHQW
and Indo-Fijian disempowerment.
After the 2006 elections, looking ahead at his last term in Parliament 
DQGZLWKDQH\HRQKLVSODFHLQKLVWRU\4DUDVHWULHGWRPDNHDPHQGVIRU
his past errant, explicitly race-based politics. He now honored the spirit of 
the power-sharing provisions of the 1997&RQVWLWXWLRQE\JLYLQJ/DERXU
nine senior ministries in his cabinet. Labour ministers in the cabinet felt 
WKDWWKHUHZDVDJHQXLQHHIIRUWWRPDNHSRZHUVKDULQJZRUN4DUDVHKLP-
self was, as he told me, full of praise for his Labour colleagues in the 
cabinet. The mood among Indo-Fijians, and in the country at large, was 
buoyant, filled with optimism that at long last Fiji might be turning the 
corner of racially divisive confrontational politics. But by then, Mahen-
GUD&KDXGKU\WKH/DERXUOHDGHUZDVFRPSOHWHO\GLVDIIHFWHG+HWKRXJKW
unlike most other people in Fiji, that the 2006 elections had been rigged. 
I thought at the time, as I covered the campaign and the weeklong vot-
ing, that there may have been inconsistencies here and there, but nothing 
that would have changed the outcome of the election. As party leader, he 
wanted to allocate portfolios to his ministers, and he wanted them to be 
accountable to him rather than to the prime minister as the Westminster 
convention requires. This was crude politics designed to destabilize the 
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multiparty government. When his ministers balked, punishing them in 
WKHQDPHRISDUW\VROLGDULW\EHFDPH&KDXGKU\ªVSULPHFRQFHUQSXUVXHG
relentlessly. At that point, the multiparty government was doomed. 
4DUDVHGLGQRWKHOSKLVFDXVHE\DWWHPSWLQJWRIXOILOOVRPHRIKLVFRQ-
troversial campaign promises, which could, and should, have been left 
for consideration later in the life of his government, if they were imple-
mented at all. These included returning the ownership of the foreshore to 
WKHLQGLJHQRXVRZQHUVWKH4ROLTROL%LOOZKLFKGHHSO\DQJHUHGGHYHORS-
ers, hoteliers, and non-Fijians generally; investigating the basis of land 
purchases in the nineteenth century with a view to returning illegally or 
fraudulently acquired lands to the traditional owners; and, most contro-
versially, bypassing established judicial procedures to release from jail 
people convicted of coup-related crimes. The story is more complex than 
it is possible to discuss here, suffused with a variety of motives. None of 
the bills actually went before Parliament, but the damage to the govern-
ment’s reputation for probity and fairness was significant, providing its 
FULWLFVZLWKSRZHUIXODPPXQLWLRQ$PRQJWKHVHFULWLFVZDV&RPPRGRUH
Frank Bainimarama, the head of the Fiji military. His wrath focused par-
WLFXODUO\RQWKHXVHRIWKH&RPSXOVRU\6XSHUYLVLRQ2UGHUWRHIIHFWHDUO\
release of prisoners convicted for their role in the mutiny in November 
2000 in which several loyal soldiers lost their lives and that nearly claimed 
the life of Bainimarama himself. He was angry, too, at the prospect of 
 facing a reduction in the size of the top-heavy military force recommended 
in a White Paper commissioned by the government. There were also issues 
surrounding the length and duration of Bainimarama’s contract. Deep 
personal animosity between military commander and prime minister did 
not help. For these and other reasons, Bainimarama unleashed his coup 
on 5 December 2006.
Fijian anger at the overthrow of a Fijian government, elected with over-
whelming indigenous Fijian support, was understandable. No one had ever 
contemplated the possibility of a Fijian military confronting a Fijian gov-
ernment, or the unceremonious humbling and humiliation of the central 
LQVWLWXWLRQVRI)LMLDQVRFLHW\WKH*UHDW&RXQFLORI&KLHIVDQGWKH0HWKRG-
LVW&KXUFK7KHUHDFWLRQRIWKH,QGR)LMLDQFRPPXQLW\ZDVUHYHDOLQJ,Q
1987 and in 2000, there had been immediate outrage: strikes were threat-
ened or mounted, trade unions mobilized, international sanctions sought. 
But there was none of that in 2006. There were many reasons. To begin 
with, there was the nature of the 2006 coup itself. This must have been 
one of the most advertised coups in the history of the world, announced 
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several years before it actually materialized: a coup by hemorrhage. When 
the denouement finally came, it was received not so much with surprise 
as with relief that the deed was finally done. It was not a coup, Bainima-
UDPDVDLGLWZDVD§&OHDQXS&DPSDLJQ¨7KHFDWFKSKUDVHFDXJKWRQLW
resonated in the experience of many who had witnessed or been victims 
of bourgeoning bribery and corruption in Fiji. “Baksheesh” (payment to 
expedite service) was fast becoming a way of life in the country. Reports 
of government largesse being channeled to constituents for political, vote-
buying purposes were well known. Many genuinely believed that Baini-
marama meant business when he promised to halt the looting of the public 
purse for political purposes. 
A new dimension to Indo-Fijian thinking was added in January 2007 
ZKHQ/DERXUOHDGHU0DKHQGUD&KDXGKU\MRLQHGWKHPLOLWDU\DGPLQLVWUD-
WLRQDVLWVILQDQFHPLQLVWHU0DQ\LQ)LMLEHOLHYHWKDW&KDXGKU\ZDVLQRQ
the game from the very beginning, a charge he denies vehemently, and for 
which he must be taken at his word. Nonetheless, throughout the steadily 
EXLOGLQJFULVLV&KDXGKU\ZDVTXLHWO\VHHNLQJDXGLHQFHZLWK%DLQLPDUDPD
after hours, keeping his powder dry, keeping abreast of the latest develop-
PHQWVDQGWDNLQJHYHU\RSSRUWXQLW\WRFULWLFL]HWKH4DUDVHJRYHUQPHQW
DQGKLVRZQPLQLVWHUVLQLW3HUKDSVOLNH%DLQLPDUDPD&KDXGKU\WRRZDV
haunted by a past that had denied him his just due, and he was determined 
QRW WR IRUJLYHKLV HQHPLHV&KDXGKU\ZDV WKH OHDGHURI WKH ,QGR)LMLDQ
community and many, for that reason alone, followed his lead. There were 
other Indo-Fijian leaders—like those of the National Federation Party, for 
instance—who opposed the coup, but theirs was a minority voice. Perhaps 
&KDXGKU\ WKRXJKWKHPLJKWEHDEOH WRXVHKLVYDVWSROLWLFDO H[SHULHQFH
to steer the novices in the military regime in a desirable direction, the 
tail that might wag the dog, but in this view he was seriously mistaken. 
A year later, he was unceremoniously dumped from the military cabinet, 
but by then the damage brought about by his involvement had been done. 
&KDXGKU\ªVSDUWLFLSDWLRQKDGJLYHQWKHPLOLWDU\UHJLPHDFHUWDLQFORDNRI
much-needed legitimacy at a time when it mattered most. Bainimarama 
had been able to buy valuable time to consolidate power and fend off 
FULWLFLVPDWKRPHDQGIURPDEURDG&KDXGKU\QRZILQGVKLPVHOIKREEOHG
on the margins, taking occasional potshots at various government poli-
cies from his website. His once strongly organized community is similarly 
disabled.
The Indo-Fijian business community switched sides in quick time, which 
comes as no surprise. When the coup took place, many were heard to say 
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that the country would bounce back to normalcy within six months. It 
did not, which forced them to take a longer-term view of things, includ-
ing the need to court elements of the military. Some supported the new 
regime because of their experience with corruption in the previous admin-
istrations, but for many, making money was their main priority, the end 
that could justify any means. The authoritarian environment suited their 
purpose. Some are known to have direct access to the members of the 
VKDGRZ\0LOLWDU\&RXQFLO7KHFRPPLWPHQWRIWKHEXVLQHVVFRPPXQLW\
to Fiji is suspect. It has been so for a while. Many have moved their nest 
HJJVVDIHO\HOVHZKHUH WR$XVWUDOLDDQG1HZ=HDODQGZKHUHPDQ\DOVR
have permanent residence. Businessmen with conscience and commitment 
have been rare in Fiji.
More surprising has been the reaction of the Indo-Fijian moral commu-
nity. After the obligatory disapproving tones, many Indo-Fijian religious 
leaders quickly fell in line. The head of the largest Hindu organization in 
Fiji, the Sanatan Dharam Pritinidhi Sabha of Fiji, declared quiet support 
for the stated goals of the coup. The acting president of the Arya Samaj, the 
wife of a high court judge, joined the military administration’s National 
&RXQFLOIRU%XLOGLQJD%HWWHU)LMLDQGXUJHGDQXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHPLOL-
WDU\ UHJLPHªVSODQV IRU)LML)URPZHVWHUQ9LWL/HYX6ZDQL0DKDUDM D
perennially changeable politician and member of several political parties 
in the past, gave similar assurances of support. The South Indian cultural 
organization Sangam expressed opposition, while the Fiji Muslim League, 
ZKRVHOHDGHUVZHUHFORVHWRWKH4DUDVHDGPLQLVWUDWLRQPDLQWDLQHGVWUDWH-
gic silence. But the overall narrative was of compliance.
A part of the reason for the support was pragmatic. There were per-
sonal business interests to consider. The regime in power had to be courted 
to receive special grants and other favors for schools and community 
projects, because it looked likely that the regime would remain in power 
for longer than originally thought. But other important reasons for sup-
porting the regime were grievance and grudge. People remembered the 
excesses of the Sunday Ban of the late 1980s, the mindless acts of religious 
vandalism, and the burning of mosques and temples and other places of 
ZRUVKLSZLWK WKH VXSSRUWRI WKH OHDGHUVRI WKH0HWKRGLVW&KXUFK¦WKH
Reverend Tomasi Raikivi, the Reverend Manasa Lasaro, and the Reverend 
9LOLDPH*RQHOHYXWRPHQWLRQMXVWWKUHH)RUWKLVUHDVRQPDQ\ZHOFRPHG
%DLQLPDUDPDªVSXQLWLYHDSSURDFKWRZDUGWKH0HWKRGLVW&KXUFKOHDGHUV
,WZDVWKHVDPHZLWKWKHKXPEOLQJDQGKXPLOLDWLRQRIWKH*UHDW&RXQFLO
RI&KLHIVZKLFKKDGVXSSRUWHGFRXSVLQWKHSDVWDQGZKLFKPDQ\WKRXJKW
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was anachronistic in the modern era. Why should this body alone decide 
who should be the president and vice president of Fiji? 
In the past, academics and tertiary students played a prominent role 
in rallying public opinion against the coups, but now, with one or two 
notable exceptions, they took a backseat. In the early days, many of them 
ZHUHVHGXFHGE\WKH§&OHDQXS&DPSDLJQ¨PHVVDJHWKHLUVWUDWHJLFVLOHQFH
quietly encouraged by the leadership of these institutions of higher learn-
ing fearing reprisals, if nothing else. Many actually believed in the pos-
sibility of the Bainimarama coup being a good coup, a means to an end, 
the end being the creation of a better-governed, race-neutral society. They 
were prepared to give the new regime the benefit of the doubt over Laise-
QLD4DUDVHDQG0DKHQGUD&KDXGKU\WZRROGSUDFWLWLRQHUVRIUDFHEDVHG
politics. A focus on personalities detracted the fundamental principles at 
stake: a military coup had deposed a democratically elected government. 
4DUDVHDQG&KDXGKU\PLJKWIDOOXQGHUWKHSURYHUELDOEXVWRPRUURZEXW
the sanctity of the ballot box must be guarded at all times. Others offered 
old, tired, extra-constitutional justifications, such as the need sometimes 
to go outside the law to protect it. Students took their cue from their teach-
ers. Their apparent indifference and apathy was dismaying, their involve-
ment in the great issues of governance almost nonexistent. Perhaps many 
were simply focused on acquiring the right qualifications to emigrate. 
Others saw opportunities for themselves and thought it undesirable to 
“rock the boat.” Edward Said’s words are apposite: “You do not want to 
appear too political; you are afraid of seeming controversial; you need the 
approval of a boss or an authority figure; you want to have a reputation 
for being balanced, objective, moderate; your hope is to be asked back, to 
consult, to be on a board or prestigious committee, and so remain within 
the responsible mainstream; someday you hope to get an honorary degree, 
a big prize, perhaps even an ambassadorship” (1994, 100–101). Said also 
wrote, “If anything can denature, neutralize, and finally kill a passionate 
intellectual life it is the internalization of such habits” (1994, 74).
Unexpected support for the coup came from Fiji’s émigré community, 
particularly from retired Indo-Fijian expatriates. Many had left Fiji, or 
had been forced to leave it, in singularly unfortunate circumstances in the 
late 1980s; some were summarily dismissed for suspected harboring of 
pro-coalition sympathies. Now in their retirement, they wanted to return 
to help set things right, to make Fiji a true, nonracial democracy, albeit 
while receiving exorbitant consultants’ salaries, almost obscene by local 
standards. Some were clearly opportunistic, yearning for a brief moment 
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in the sun before the inevitable twilight. But there were also among them 
technocratic ideologues with little confidence in the institutions and prac-
tices of electoral politics to deliver desired outcomes. They had no time for 
ZLFNHGSROLWLFLDQVZKRSOD\HGWKHUDFHFDUGWRZLQHOHFWLRQV9RWHUVFRXOG
not be trusted to know what was in their own best interests. Elections were 
problematic, low voter turnout endemic in developing countries, corrup-
tion and scandals rampant, and alienation of people from the processes of 
governance growing, leading to the conclusion that democracy may not be 
the most appropriate form of government for all societies. They therefore 
WKUHZ WKHLUZHLJKWEHKLQG WKH VRFDOOHG§3HRSOHV&KDUWHU¨DGRFXPHQW
full of motherhood statements lifted straight from a Good Governance 
101 course, to put the country onto autopilot, leaving elected politicians 
only to dot the i’s and cross the t’s. The charter has now become the 
military regime’s roadmap, its foundational document, but it is honored 
more in the breach as the regime tramples on principles of natural justice 
DQGEDVLFKXPDQULJKWVLQRUGHUWRHQWUHQFKLWVHOI&KDUWHUVXSSRUWHUVDUH
caught in a bind: they can neither condone the excesses of the regime that 
their participation helped to legitimize nor condemn it outright. Like most 
Indo-Fijians, they too are caught in a cul-de-sac. 
Some responses are easily categorized, but others are not. Many Indo-
Fijians, perhaps the majority, have no view either way. Their standard of 
life has not changed much at all since 2006; quite the contrary, they live 
precariously on the charity and sufferance of others. People who have 
endured enough upheaval in their lives for the last two decades hope that 
this too will pass soon so that they can get on with their lives. It is resigna-
tion borne not of indifference or fatalism but of experience of an endless 
cycle of promises made and broken. I should at this point declare my 
own hand. I have been a strong opponent of military coups in Fiji. I was 
as opposed to them in 1987 as I was in 2006. For me, there is something 
deeply immoral (quite apart from being illegal) about overturning the ver-
dict of the ballot box with the bayonet. The history of the world shows 
WKDWFRXSVGRQªWVROYHSUREOHPVWKH\PHUHO\FRPSRXQGWKHP9LROHQFHDV
an instrument of policy is always counterproductive. And I believe deeply 
that the intellectual classes (but not they alone) have the sacred responsi-
bility to speak truth to power. If we don’t, who will? I did that in my own 
small way, speaking and writing against coups and their consequences 
for Fiji, and I have paid the price. I was interrogated by the military in 
November 2009 and expelled from the country, the land of my birth. I 
have no rancor or bitterness: if that is the price that had to be paid for 
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standing up for the values of democracy and the rule of law, then I am 
glad I paid it.
Five years after the 2006 coup, the Indo-Fijian community, diminished 
and demoralized, is caught between a rock and a hard place. The rheto-
ric providing the initial justification for the coup rings hollow now. The 
§&OHDQXS&DPSDLJQ¨KDV\LHOGHGIHZUHVXOWVH[FHSWPRUHHPEDUUDVVPHQW
IRU WKH PLOLWDU\ UHJLPH DQG LWV EXQJOLQJ )LML ,QGHSHQGHQW &RPPLVVLRQ
$JDLQVW&RUUXSWLRQKHDGHGE\DVHUYLQJPLOLWDU\RIILFHU/LNHWKH4DUDVH
DGPLQLVWUDWLRQWKHPLOLWDU\UHJLPHWRRKDVXVHGWKH&RPSXOVRU\6XSHUYL-
sion Order to effect early release from prison of people convicted for vari-
ous coup-related crimes, including manslaughter of civilians, thus denting 
its claims of moral superiority over the regime it deposed. It is now clear 
that the military will only countenance a new political order in which it 
has a visible and permanent presence. A militarized democracy is in the 
offing. Burma as a comparison comes to mind. There are many Indo-
Fijians who, having supported the coup thus far, feel that there can be no 
turning back. They have burned their bridges with the Fijian community. 
They know that they are seen by others, fairly or unfairly, as aiding and 
abetting the coup through various acts of omission or commission. If the 
coup fails, they know they are done for, and so out of desperate necessity 
they back Bainimarama because they know that he is the only one who 
stands between them and anarchy. Indeed, some are beginning to embrace 
KLPDVWKHLUUHDOOHDGHUUDWKHUWKDQ0DKHQGUD&KDXGKU\RUDQ\RQHHOVH
The impulses underlying this kind of thinking are understandable but 
wrongheaded and in truth counterproductive. Rhetoric of non-racialism 
aside, the Bainimarama coup is morphing into a “Fijian” coup as many 
Fijians take up opportunities left by the departing Indo-Fijians and as prov-
ince after province lines up to “apologize” to Bainimarama for opposing 
his regime. The presence in the interim administration of such notable for-
mer coup supporters and members of the hard-line Taukei Movement as 
Inoke Kubuabola and Filipe Bole is reassuring to them. Bainimarama has 
vowed not to allow 1987-era politicians to stand for elections in the future 
and yet has rewarded two of them with senior positions in his adminis-
tration. There is talk of nonracial equality, but not a word has been said 
about opening up the almost racially exclusive military to non-Fijians. 
The ethnic imbalance in the public sector is glaring. Military personnel 
LQFUHDVLQJO\WDNHXSVHQLRUFLYLOLDQSRVLWLRQV&RPPRGRUH%DLQLPDUDPD
promises to address the perennial land-lease problem by making avail-
able unused Fijian land on ninety-nine year leases for agricultural pur-
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poses. It sounds an attractive proposition on paper, but it is like locking 
the gate after the horse has already bolted. The sugar industry is dying 
and no amount of artificial resuscitation will revive it. Places in northern 
9DQXD/HYX¦:DLQLNRUR/DJDODJD1DTLTL&RTHORD¦DUHHPSW\LQJDWD
depressingly rapid rate as people move into the congested squatter settle-
ments, principally in the Suva-Nausori corridor where an estimated one 
third of the total population now lives, often in wretched conditions. Yet 
those displaced from the farming country say they will never return to the 
perpetual uncertainties of the past. The umbilical cord is severed for good. 
Many are contemplating an overseas future for their children.
For the Indo-Fijians, as indeed for Fiji as a whole, the last forty years 
have been a time of frustration and bewilderment, the promise of indepen-
dence having gone awry. A large part of the problem lay with the archi-
tecture of the independence political order itself. It was constructed on 
the pillars of ethnic compartmentalization, while, with time and with the 
advent of new forces of change, “race” largely lost its relevance in daily life 
to all but the leaders who continued to embrace it as “a fact of life.” When 
power was finally wrested from the ruling elite at the ballot box, the mili-
tary was unleashed to win it back. In a strange twist of irony, the military, 
which was nurtured as the ultimate bastion of power for the Fijian estab-
lishment, returned in 2006 to destroy its very foundations. It now looks 
unlikely that it will ever completely disappear from the political scene. 
Power concedes nothing without a struggle, and once out, soldiers do not 
voluntarily return to the barracks. The intense and deeply felt debates over 
the last forty years about strengthening the institutions of parliamentary 
democracy—electoral systems, political parties, constitutional protection 
of rights, institutional mechanisms for strengthening the participation of 
citizens in the governance of the country—seem in the end to have been 
a wasted effort. There is poignant irony in the fact that a community 
committed broadly to a nonviolent, Gandhian approach to politics, and 
that itself had been a victim of coups in the past, now endorses, however 
indirectly or tangentially, violence as an instrument of public policy in the 
desperate hope of a better outcome.
The Indo-Fijian community itself has changed almost beyond recog-
nition in the last forty years. The self-contained, self-sustaining rural 
com munity built around the sugar industry is uprooted and adrift. The 
settlements in the cane areas that once hummed with life—local sports 
competitions, festivals, and festivities—now look empty and forlorn. The 
land has ceased to be the sole source of livelihood for most families, includ-
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LQJP\RZQ9LOODJHVDUHQRZHVVHQWLDOO\UHVLGHQWLDOVLWHV7KHUHLVDGHHS
yearning among most young people still stranded in rural areas to leave 
for someplace else. The rapid transformation of the rural scene is eroding 
a culture and a way of life that once formed the bedrock of Indo-Fijian 
VRFLHW\DQGSURYLGHGDGLUHFWOLQNWRLWVIRXQGDWLRQDOSDVW&XWIURPLWV
cultural moorings, with declining support and sustenance from its roots, 
the community is vulnerable, much more at the mercy of forces of change 
beyond its control. It is, in truth, living on the sufferance of others. In the 
early 1970s, migration would have appeared a very distant prospect for 
most Indo-Fijians. It was something that only the wealthy and the well 
connected might contemplate. It is a daily occurrence now, uppermost 
in the minds of most people, if not for themselves then certainly for their 
children. The community is emotionally uprooted. It is often said with 
some truth that there is hardly a single Indo-Fijian family in Fiji that does 
not have at least one member abroad. The emotional center of gravity has 
shifted. Perhaps in time, “From Immigration to Emigration” will become 
the dominant narrative in the overall experience of the Indo-Fijian com-
munity, its Fiji sojourn a momentary stopover in the life of a people con-
demned by fate to scatter around the world. But by then, people of my 
generation will have moved on. In the words of John Dryden:
Not Heav’n itself upon the past
Has pow’r
But what has been has been, and I
Have had my hour
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Abstract
Fiji’s postcolonial journey has been fraught. The promise of prosperity and politi-
cal stability, high at the time of independence in 1970, dissipated soon after-
ward as the politics of ethnicity came to the fore and as disagreements developed 
among indigenous Fijians and Indo-Fijians about the nature and direction of pub-
lic policy. A military coup in 1987 removed a democratically elected government, 
but instead of ensuring the entrenchment of Fijian political control, it unleashed 
IRUFHVZKRVHXOWLPDWHHIIHFWZDVWKHXQGHUPLQLQJRI)LMLDQSROLWLFDOXQLW\&RP-
modore Frank Bainimarama’s coup in 2006 removed from power an indigenous 
Fijian–led government, promising in the process to overturn the assumptions and 
understandings about power sharing that underpinned the understandings and 
assumptions that were embedded in the Independence constitution and to lead the 
country towards a non-racial future. The reaction to the latest coup from Fiji’s 
different communities remains a matter of intense debate in the country.
keywords: Fiji, independence, military coup, land problems, emigration, Fijian 
diaspora, constitution making
